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In the beginning of the 21st century, humanity faces multiple unprecedented global dilemmas 
that defy easy solutions and call into question the ability of the liberal democracies to rise to 
answer them. At the same time, advancements in sciences and technology have made it 
possible for humans to shape their own biology like never before, sparking a discussion on 
the ethical permissibility of humans seeking to enhance themselves or their descendants. Set 
against this background, the purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, to give a general 
overview of the so-called human enhancement debate, analyzing arguments for and against 
enhancement interventions and weighing their merits and weaknesses. Second, to advance an 
argument that the introduction of a particular type of enhancement, moral enhancement, is 
desirable from the point of view of generating morally more responsible political decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the 21st century, humanity faces a plethora of unprecedented dilemmas. Fueled by 
consumerism, climate change and global warming threaten to submerge coastal cities beneath 
the waves, cause widespread droughts and increase the frequency of natural disasters. 
Deteriorating environmental conditions force people to move towards the global north en 
masse, stoking questions about immigration, human rights and the limits of compassion. 
Automation and robotization promise to free humans from labor – and threaten to leave 
millions unemployed, putting societies and the economic system to the test and spreading 
ever wider the gulf between the haves and the have-nots. Due to these questions and a myriad 
of others, some have begun to ask if humans as a species are ill-equipped to face these 
problems, and if so, what could be done to arm them for the times to come? 
The human enhancement debate is the ongoing discussion about making humans “better” in 
one way or another, usually proposed to be done through employing either the biomedical 
sciences or emerging technologies. Though still largely hypothetical, human enhancement 
has become one of the major talking points of applied ethics in the recent decades, interest in 
it constantly bolstered by developments in both science and society. The usage of prescription 
amphetamines by university students to boost their focus. Adopting genetic testing and 
embryo selection to avoid unwanted mutations in offspring. Employing CRISPR-Cas9 gene-
editing to produce babies immune to the HI-virus. These are all real-world examples of the 
ways humans have meddled with their own nature in the recent years. The dream of 
becoming “better than well”, achieving unheard physical or mental performance, is at least as 
old as classical Greece and its stories of demigods. Many hope – and others fear – that with 
these advancements, that dream is finally within humanity’s reach. 
Those that find cause for alarm in the aforementioned developments usually ground their 
reasoning in a certain view of human nature and capability. They fear we might think 
ourselves too clever, and in our rush to enhance ourselves accidentally do away with 
something valuable that was merely masquerading as a weakness. What if we discover how 
to stop aging and to live forever, only to find out that our mortality was the very thing that 
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made our lives meaningful? Another concern often raised is that human enhancement, should 
it become readily available, is bound to create more inequality in our already unjust societies. 
As betterment is something people crave and are willing to pay for, it would seem unlikely it 
will be available for everyone. This might create a society where the less well-off are not 
only poorer when it comes to wealth, but also underprivileged genetically. With time, 
humanity might develop in to two separate species – the limited humans of today and the 
superior post-humans of tomorrow. 
The pressing global issues combined with worries that human enhancement might promote 
injustice have caused some proponents of the enhancement project to champion a certain type 
of enhancement: that of a moral kind. The basic argument here is that unlike in the case of 
increasing muscle strength or cognitive performance, a moral enhancement would not count 
as a competitive advantage for the individuals enhanced so. Rather, the benefits of moral 
enhancement would be reaped principally by the community around the enhanced. A morally 
enhanced individual would be less inclined to lie, cheat or cause the people around them 
harm for their own advantage. They could better keep their focus on long-term payoffs 
instead of seeking to gratify their immediate desires. Since many of the global issues of today 
are either caused or aggravated by human inability to undertake unpleasant but morally good 
projects, it seems like there could be much gained by investing in moral enhancement. Yet 
there are some who view even moral enhancement as questionable. They argue that even if 
the enhanced themselves might be unprejudiced and have everyone’s best interests at heart, 
their inclusion to society might still disenfranchise the unenhanced in one way or another. 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, I am going to give an overview of the human 
enhancement debate in general, characterizing the arguments and positions commonly 
displayed by those for and against it. I will conclude this part by presenting my view on the 
current state of the debate. Second, I am going to take a closer look at human moral 
enhancement, and in doing so advance an argument that although in some cases moral 
enhancement can be problematic from the viewpoint equality, we still have strong incentives 
to pursue it in the name of generating morally better political decisions. Before tackling either 
of these parts, however, I am going to give a brief explanation of what I understand the term 
‘human enhancement’ to mean. 
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2. What is human enhancement? 
 
In enhancement literature, an ample amount of pages has been devoted to trying to define 
what human enhancement exactly is. This has more often than not taken the form of trying to 
find relevant criteria on how to know when some intervention is no longer within the scope of 
therapeutic interventions and crosses over into the domain of enhancement.  
One example of a proposed solution to this question is the beyond-species-maximum 
approach (Gyngell & Selgelid 2016, p. 115-116), which holds that something should be 
considered an enhancement if it would raise the individual being enhanced above what was 
before humanly possible. This approach, however, suffers from being too narrow. Consider 
an individual who is physically very weak, barely able to lift a stack of heavy books off their 
desk. This person could be, through biomedical interventions, be empowered to be on par 
with history’s greatest Olympic weightlifters, but according to the beyond-species-maximum 
approach this would still not count as an enhancement. After all, he is still within what we 
consider the limits of human performance. This seems to reflect quite poorly our 
understanding of what it means to enhance someone. Another problem for this view is that 
what we consider to be the limits of human capacity are in constant flux. In the world of 
professional sports, hardly a year goes by without somebody breaking one world record or 
another. This means that something could be considered an enhancement today, but it would 
cease to be an enhancement tomorrow should an unenhanced person be born with a special 
capacity for reaching new heights in one field or another. This makes basing any possible 
enhancement-related regulations on the idea of a species maximum a difficult one. A broader 
alternative conception of enhancement would be the beyond-species-typical approach 
(Gyngell & Selgelid 2016, p. 114-115), which, as the name implies, sets the bar for 
enhancement on providing humans with capacities that exceed those typically observed in the 
species. Now the physically weak person we previously made into a world-class weightlifter 
would definitely be counted amongst the enhanced. Still, this view is not without its problems 
either. Humans as a species have a wide spectrum of capabilities, and what is typical of these 
capabilities is influenced by a huge number of factors, such as age, sex, ethnicity, socio-
economic status, and so on. It is typical for an old person to have more issues with their 
memory than a young person would have, and without taking this into account, we can’t use 
species-typical categorizations effectively. If we do take all of the relevant factors into 
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account, however, we end up with a very individualistic view of enhancement, which does 
not bring us much closer to our goal of being able to easily define interventions as 
enhancements or otherwise. 
These two examples are hopefully sufficient in highlighting how difficult it is to satisfyingly 
define the concept of enhancement. Instead of trying to produce an answer to the question, I 
will next endeavor to give a non-technical, common-sense explanation of the typical 
objective of enhancement interventions. Human societies are full of examples of people 
doing various things to boost their performance in one way or another. We are all aware that 
sleeping enough and eating both healthily and in sensible intervals increases our alertness and 
general well-being. Many people drink coffee or tea for the short-term boost to focus that the 
caffeine in them provides, and nootropics and smart drugs are also swiftly becoming more 
common. For example, prescription amphetamines, such as Adderall, are used to treat 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), but healthy people not suffering from the 
disorder are also obtaining and using these drugs to increase their productivity. These 
relatively common performance enhancers, however, also have notable downsides. Their 
effects either don’t last very long or they might have adverse side-effects, or perhaps 
maintaining their effects are in some ways too demanding for many people’s tastes. Caffeine 
might get you through a late shift at work but then keep you up at night, and not all people 
have steady timetables that enable them to have a balanced sleep cycle. Producing these 
desired effects (and a myriad of other desired effects) without the downsides or the effort 
they sometimes require is the basic objective of human enhancement interventions. The hope 
is that as understanding of biology and technology grows, we could – through smart drugs, 
genetic engineering, technological aids or some combination of these – provide people with 
safe and efficient ways of giving them increased performance in the areas of their desire. It 
should not be understood, however, that the scope of human enhancement is limited to just 
providing safer and more effective alternatives to performance boosters we already have 
available. I have merely used them here as a way of communicating that even if human 
enhancement literacy can sometimes be likened to science fiction, enhancements do not have 
to be grand or society-altering by their nature. Sometimes enhancement can just mean 
providing people with pills that give them heightened focus with no adverse side effects. 
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3. The human enhancement debate 
 
The traditional way to summarize the human enhancement debate is to present it as a back-
and-forth between two opposed factions, the transhumanists and the bioconservatives, 
debating over the moral value of the so-called therapy-enhancement distinction or dichotomy 
(Bostrom & Roache 2008, p. 120). Simplified, this means the question of do interventions 
carried out for the purposes of enhancement differ morally from those carried out for the sake 
of merely maintaining or restoring health.  Transhumanists are taken to unequivocally 
support every form of enhancement, whereas bioconservatives are expected to oppose it in all 
its forms, while at the same time still wanting to allow humans to use therapeutic 
interventions. The debate then boils down to the question whether the bioconservatives can 
show some relevant way in which the two forms of interventions differ from one another so 
that one could be viewed as morally permissible and the other as unacceptable (Bostrom & 
Roache 2008, p. 122). As noted in the last section, this question of defining enhancement is 
notoriously difficult. One of the classic problems is the categorization of vaccines, which are 
commonly viewed as therapeutic interventions promoting good health, but could just as 
easily also be described as an intervention aimed at enhancing the immune system (Ibid., p. 
120). 
This, of course, is a crude oversimplification of decades of academic discourse.  In reality, 
there is wide variety of questions discussed in relation to the project of human enhancement, 
as well as a varied spectrum of stances between the most ardent supporters of enhancement 
and its harshest critics. Authors have approached human enhancement, for example, from the 
point of view of virtue ethics (Fröding 2013), Christian Transhumanism (Cole-Turner 2017) 
as well as questions pertaining to forgiveness and tolerance (Räikkä & Ahteensuu 2016). 
Some authors have suggested there are additional schools of thought situated between the 
extremes of transhumanism and bioconservatism, such as the in principle allowing but still 
cautious bioliberals (Roache & Savulescu 2016, p. 145) or biomoderates (Giubilini & Sanyal 
2016, p. 2). Others have taken to using different names all together, such as using 
conservationists instead of bioconservatives in order to distance the debate from political 
liberal-conservative divides and to highlight the group’s core agenda of conserving the 
current expression of human nature (Lilley 2013, p. 2). Some authors resist easy for-or-
against categorization all together, such as those coming from the discipline of disability 
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studies, who take both the proponents and opponents of enhancement to task over explaining 
why any type of embodiment, enhanced or otherwise, is preferable to any other type of bodily 
existence (Rehmann-Sutter et al. 2014). 
In the interest of not muddying the waters by using politically charged terms such as 
conservative and liberal, I am going to follow Alberto Giubilini and Sagar Sanyal (2015) in 
describing the different stances simply as ‘opponents of enhancement’ and ‘proponents of 
enhancement’. I will next paint a broad picture of how I understand these restrictive and 
permissive positions, after which I will look at the current state of the debate. 
 
3.1 Opponents of human enhancement 
 
It is difficult to present any sort of general overview of positions held by the opponents of 
human enhancement, mainly because while they all do oppose the enhancement project, most 
of them do so on very different grounds. Because of this, I think that the best way to 
effectively characterize the opponents is to go through some of the most common arguments 
they present. 
The one common feature at least almost all of the opponents of enhancement share is the 
insistence on there being a meaningful moral difference between enhancement and therapy. 
The reason for this is quite clear: if there was no difference to be found, then in order to 
believably oppose enhancement interventions the opponents would also have to oppose 
common and highly beneficial medical interventions, the banning of which would lead to 
great human suffering. The different answers given to how and why therapy and 
enhancement differ from each other are numerous and varied. As I do not think there are any 
identifiable most popular or strongest arguments, I will not be listing them here. Some of 
them, however, will become evident as we next look at some of the most common arguments 
presented by the opponents. 
One such argument is one concerning human dignity. Since the term resists simple definition, 
it is perhaps best understood as an equal moral value of human agents that stems from simply 
being a member of the human race. Simply put, the worry here is that if we start enhancing 
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humanity we might do something to undermine either the dignity of the enhanced or the 
dignity of those who, for one reason or another, are ‘left behind’ as unenhanced. Leon Kass 
has argued that if turning “a man into a cockroach” would obviously be dehumanizing, then 
perhaps we should consider that making a human “more than a man” might also be so (Kass 
2003, p. 20). On the other hand, others have expressed fears of human enhancement creating 
a superior class of people who are not just better but also morally more valuable (Fukuyama 
2003, p. 153-154). This would undermine our understanding of all human lives being of 
equal value, and could enable us to treat the unenhanced inhumanely. Closely tied in with this 
fear is the more familiar threat of increasing socio-economic inequality: human enhancement 
might be expensive and thus only available to well-off people, which would disenfranchise 
the poor even further1. Why would anybody hire a person who gets tired and has to stay home 
sick from time to time if they have the option of employing an enhanced human with superior 
focus and health? In time, unenhanced but otherwise healthy people might become to be 
perceived as inferior, perhaps even as somehow disabled (Franssen 2014, p. 177). 
Another often pointed out concern is that of humans “playing God”2 – a charge which, 
despite the name, can quite easily be explained on secular terms. Unlike an omnipotent god, 
human are not perfect and all-knowing, but instead prone to failure and overestimating their 
competence. Thus, there is a very real possibility that if we start meddling with something as 
complicated as human nature, we might in our folly break something important. This view 
has been proposed to tie in with a view of natural processes, such as evolution, being superior 
to artificial, human-created interventions (Harris 2007, p. 35). Viewed as such, attempts at 
tampering with natural processes could easily backfire as we fail to take into account their 
complex balance that has been achieved over eons of evolution, giving us reason not to try 
our hand at it in the first place. The “playing God” arguments can be further separated into 
two categories, epistemological arguments and arguments from unacceptable risks. 
1. The epistemological variant of the “playing God” argument holds that since we have 
but limited knowledge of both ourselves and the future, we cannot be justified in 
                                                
1 This issue is not voiced only by the opponents of enhancement. For example, Nick Bostrom and Rebecca 
Roache, who number among the most well-known supporters of the human enhancement project, have also 
pointed out the same concern (Bostrom & Roache 2008, p. 14-15). 
 
2 It should be noted that the term “playing God” is more frequently used by the proponents of the enhancement 
to allude to certain arguments presented by the opponents’ than by the opponents themselves (e.g. Harris 2010; 
Coady 2010; Brock 2010). 
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claiming to know what would be an enhancement. Having more muscle mass is a 
burden in a society that does not value physical prowess, and increased longevity is 
only a blessing if living itself is pleasant. Thus in many cases, especially in the case of 
enhancing our descendants, the human enhancement project seems to presuppose that 
we can have credible estimates about future societies so that we can also claim to 
know which abilities will be beneficial to the people living in them (Rehmann-Sutter 
et al. 2014, p. 9). There also seems to be many scenarios where it is simply impossible 
to objectively value if something is an enhancement or not: would a child’s life be 
better if they had a gene that made them a musical prodigy (Sparrow 2016, p. 131)? 
 
2. While the argument from unacceptable risks has been presented in many forms, 
Normal Daniels has written perhaps the most efficient of these formulations. He 
writes:  
 
“But if we are trying to improve on an otherwise normal trait, the risk of a bad 
outcome, even if small, outweigh the acceptable outcome of normality.”  
(Daniels 2009, p. 38) 
 
Here Daniels is saying that while we perhaps could indeed better ourselves in one way 
or another, being just an ordinary human is not terrible as it is. Since all interventions 
always carry at least some sort of risk, we should not take a gamble at doing needless 
interventions that we could do without. Daniels’ argument also helps shed light on a 
possible stance on why enhancements are to be banned while therapeutic 
interventions should still be allowed for. Yes, therapeutic interventions might also 
entail risks, but since without resorting to them humans might be permanently stuck in 
an unacceptable state of abnormalcy3, those risks are justified. 
The final commonly featured argument is that of diminishing autonomy, the most well-known 
version of which has been presented by Jürgen Habermas (2003). Here, the worry is that the 
people being enhanced are in one way or another going to be subjugated to the will of the 
enhancers – the enhanced humans becoming instruments of someone else’s design 
                                                
3 The relevance of normalcy has been called into question by John Harris. He argues that as a concept that is 
both context-sensitive and historically prone to change, normalcy can hold no moral value when it comes to the 
human enhancement debate (Harris 2007, p. 54). 
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(Habermas 2003, p. 53-54). This worry is most salient when discussing the topic of 
enhancing children in one way or another. Taking a page from Habermas, Robert Sparrow 
has presented this view (Sparrow 2013, p. 26) as follows. When educating a small child, the 
child nevertheless has a possibility of calling the things they are being taught into question. 
Then, the burden of justifying the reasoning and norms behind their teaching is on the 
teacher, and the child can choose to accept their reasoning or not. There could even be a 
possibility of the child asking a question of such profound insight that it forces the teacher to 
re-evaluate their own argument or to change their mind on the subject. By comparison, 
biomedical interventions such as enhancements, do not afford the people being enhanced this 
sort of possibility. They work on the basis of a subject (the enhancer) reshaping an object (the 
person being enhanced).  This worry is most often raised when discussing moral 
enhancements, but it can be as easily evoked when the discussion turns to manipulating the 
genes of unborn children to select for traits viewed as desirable by the parents-to-be. 
Summing up, the opponents of the human enhancement think that the project is fraught with 
risks, some of them dire enough to call for policies on restricting or outright prohibiting 
research into it. Humans are not wise or knowledgeable enough to know what to enhance and 
how, and even if they somehow got it right, the enhancement interventions might still cause 
suffering or have unacceptable outcomes, such as diminishing of autonomy or a creation of a 
new race of post-humans. The opponents still think that therapeutic interventions are justified 
because even if the line between therapy and enhancement can be vague, the therapeutic 
interventions humans have and are using today do not have these same issues. Making a sick 
person healthy ensures that they will not be left behind and have a fair chance at leading a 
good life; making a healthy person better than well, on the other hand, enables them to ascend 
above others.  
 
3.2 Proponents of human enhancement 
 
While the proponents of enhancement have a lot in common, such as obviously displaying 
generally permissible attitudes towards enhancement interventions and being in most cases 
unmoved by the opposition’s arguments, they are also far from a homogenous group. Some 
argue in favor of enhancement on the grounds of morphological freedom, a person’s right to 
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do what they want with their own body (Sandberg 2003), while others take enhancing 
ourselves or our children not only to be a right, but also a moral obligation (Savulescu 2001; 
Savulescu & Kahane 2009). Authors who are generally in favor of enhancing humanity can 
also take stances that are more critical when it comes to specific forms of enhancement. John 
Harris, a stalwart supporter of cognitive enhancement, has argued specifically against moral 
enhancement (Harris 2010) based on the threat he sees it pose to autonomy. Nicholas Agar, 
on the other hand, has expressed a stance of supporting enhancement only within certain 
limits. According to Agar, we should not radically enhance humanity such as to raise human 
capabilities beyond the current norms, but rather stick to moderate levels of enhancement in 
order not to endanger the current human identity (Agar 2013). As is evident from these varied 
stances, it is not simple to generalize the position of the proponents of human enhancements. 
Still, I am going to try to lay out some core ideas that at least most of them could accept. 
First off, the proponents generally subscribe to a welfarist conception of medicine. According 
to this view, the goal of medicine is not just to cure disease, but to increase human wellbeing 
in general, which is also the goal of human enhancement (Savulescu, Sandberg & Kahane 
2011, p. 8). Thus, traditional therapeutic interventions and enhancement interventions should 
not be taken to be separate things, but rather facets of the same discipline. Continuing this 
mode of thinking, the proponents also often take many other non-medical and mundane 
interventions that improve human performance to be similarly difficult (and pointless) to 
separate from enhancement interventions (Bostrom & Roache 2009, p. 1). Examples of this 
include the already mentioned drinking of coffee to boost alertness, and even partaking in 
public education for varied cognitive improvements from memory to logical thinking. 
Second, the proponents predominantly view that the wide range and variety of abilities and 
capacities already displayed by the different members of the human race means that moral 
status (or perhaps “human dignity” to which the opponents of enhancement sometimes refer 
to) cannot be grounded in such abilities or capacities (Bostrom & Roache 2008, p. 143). As 
an example, consider the following. Throughout history, rationality and critical thinking have 
been proposed as abilities that are essentially human. Despite this, we do not usually take 
particularly witless humans to be of lesser moral value than those humans whose cognitive 
capabilities are unusually high. At the very least, we would not ordinarily consider sacrificing 
their wellbeing for the wellbeing of more rational or critically minded people to be just. 
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Third, proponents express doubts that some of the resistance against the enhancement project 
consists of a form of status quo bias (Bostrom & Ord 2004), a preference for maintaining 
things as they are currently, even when the proposed change has strong evidence to be for the 
better. They point to historical evidence, such as the initial aversion towards now common 
interventions like oral contraceptives (Bostrom & Roache 2009, p. 5), to suggest that the 
opposition of enhancements comes from an emotional place and actually stems more from 
enhancements being novel than from being problematic. 
Fourth, the proponents usually contend that there are at least some types of enhancements 
that are not valuable solely on the basis of providing positional advantage. When a person 
holds positional advantage, it means that they have advantage in relation to somebody else. 
Thus, if something only holds positional value, it means that the thing is valuable only insofar 
as it grants the person who has it a competitive advantage against somebody or something. As 
an example, if we enhance a person to be able to eat five times as much food as they are now 
capable of ingesting, it probably gives a huge positional advantage to a professional 
competitive eater, but would probably be of no value if the sport of competitive eating did not 
exist. If enhancements were to have only positional value, it would make them hard to defend 
for two reasons. First, because then enhancement would probably only serve to widen the gulf 
between the people with ample resources (and thus in all probability a better opportunity to 
enhance themselves) and those without them (Sandel 2004). Second, because then the value 
of enhancement would disappear if we enhanced everybody or at least most of the people 
competing with each other (Bostrom & Roache 2008, p. 130). Everybody’s newly gained 
positional advantage would be nullified, and we would have spent a lot of time, resources and 
effort on the enhancement project for nothing. The proponents of enhancement, however, 
argue that they have identified a number of enhancements that would also have value not 
based on positional advantage. The most common examples are enhancements to health and 
intelligence4 (Bostrom & Roache 2008), which are thought to be valuable because they 
increase the enhanced person’s chances of living a good life through fostering general well-
being (health) and granting a greater capacity to decide what to do with their lives 
(intelligence; I will elaborate on this shortly). However, even if this is so, it still does not 
remove the fact that people enhanced with superior cognitive capacities would be at a 
                                                
4 And moral enhancement, but I have omitted mentioning it here because it is to be discussed in greater detail 
later. 
 
 
12 
competitive advantage against the unenhanced, even if this would not be the enhancement’s 
only or even primary source of value. 
Finally, the proponents of enhancement maintain that at least some types of enhancements 
would not undermine the autonomy of the enhanced. Instead, the proponents have argued that 
human enhancement could even promote autonomy in place of curbing it (Savulescu & 
Kahane 2009, p. 282). Here, I am again going to use enhancements to intelligence as an 
example. Having a high intelligence can be seen as promoting autonomy, since high 
intelligence (or at least a high level of certain kind of intelligence) is required to do many 
things in life one could aspire for, like become an expert on theoretical physics. On the other 
hand, there are no aspirations the realization of which would require being of lower 
intelligence. Thus, improving someone’s intelligence does not ‘close any doors’ on their 
choices, so to speak. If this is true, then a person with enhanced intelligence could have a 
wider variety of options when it comes to deciding what do with their life. In this light, it 
would be hard to argue that the people who made them more intelligent decided their destiny 
for them. 
To sum this all up, the proponents of human enhancement generally view at least that 
enhancement has the same goal as medicine in general – the improvement of human 
wellbeing – and hold that some types of enhancements would not undermine the equal moral 
value of individuals or threaten their autonomy. Instead, these enhancements would be 
valuable because they have the capacity to make human lives better. They also express 
doubts that resistance to the enhancement project stems more from the fact that the 
enhancement inventions suggested are novel, not from problems in the interventions 
themselves. 
Note that this description of the proponents’ beliefs is intended to act only as a baseline – 
there are many supporters of human enhancement who would go well beyond what I have 
said here. For example, some could suggest that enhancement is also valuable because it 
benefits the whole of society. Even if this were the case, I would still take them to accept that 
at least part of the overall value of enhancements comes from also benefitting the enhanced 
themselves. 
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3.3 State of the debate 
 
While it should not be said that the discussion concerning human enhancement has stagnated, 
some major discussion points have remained largely unchanged for at least a decade. The key 
issue of whether human enhancement should be seen as being outside the scope of medicine 
or not, in particular, has seen little notable developments. The proponents have maintained 
their position of holding it pointless to try to separate enhancement and therapy from each 
other, and the opponents have been unable to present a compelling argument for why it 
should be, or how it could be, done. Most of the potential explanations, such as alluding to 
what is typical for the human species and drawing a line for the goals of medicine there, must 
resort to employing some type of concept of normalcy. What is typical or “normal” for 
humans has repeatedly changed throughout the history of the species in response to 
developments in the environment, living conditions, culture, and science. Any explanation 
trying to make use of the normative value of the current set of typical capacities a human 
might possess has to be able to explain how we can be sure that how we are right now is 
good5, and also why it is still acceptable for these trait to change in the future as long as the 
reason for that change is not human enhancement. After all, it is unlikely that we will cease to 
change in response to our environment even if we abandoned the human enhancement 
project, and many of these species-shaping changes have their origins in human actions, not 
in non-artificial nature. 
At the same time, the proponents have had to concede that when a new technology, such as 
human enhancement, is brought to a society with existing inequalities, its benefits are not 
likely going to be distributed evenly. The most common defense against this charge has been 
to justify the potential increase in inequality by alluding to the great benefits that could be 
reaped by everyone, such as scientific breakthroughs that the cognitively enhanced could 
provide the society with (Bostrom & Roache 2008, p. 15). Also of note is the argument that 
enhancement could be provided to those without means through governmental subsidiaries, 
as at least most liberal democracies do with basic education (Bostrom 2003, p. 500; Mehlman 
2009; Veit 2018, p. 88). However, the fact remains that the potential societal benefits of the 
enhancement project are purely hypothetical. We simply cannot know if building a cognitive 
                                                
5 That is, at least if we agree that most humans are today in many ways better off than they were a hundred years 
ago. 
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enhancement clinic in every town will actually increase the number of scientific 
breakthroughs or not, because scientific breakthroughs might largely depend on factors other 
than the researchers being as smart as possible. It is, however, much easier to envision people 
with superior focus or memory being able to gain entrance to higher education and achieve 
success in their occupational life more effectively than their unenhanced peers. 
Outside the charge just laid out, it is hard to find the other arguments presented by the 
opponents of enhancement very convincing – at least when the scope of enhancement 
remains within certain limits. If we do not enhance anybody against their will as well as 
restrict ourselves to types of enhancement that can be argued not to be detrimental to 
autonomy and to be beneficial to general well-being, then many of the arguments presented 
by the opposition lose their edge. It is difficult to see how someone could be said to have 
been treated merely as a means to an end when their cognitive capacities have been improved 
or they have been made immune to a dangerous disease. Rather, this would seem like 
empowering them. From this point of view, the concerns raised in the epistemological variant 
of the “playing God” argument seem unlikely as well. It is hard to imagine a plausible future 
society were being more intelligent or healthier would be a bad thing. 
What about the autonomy of the unenhanced people? If we introduced enhanced humans into 
the society, they could, in time, come to view the unenhanced people as somehow defective 
(Franssen 2014, p. 177). From this premise, then, it could be argued that the enhanced 
humans could then view it as their moral duty to start enhancing the unenhanced even against 
their will, for their own good. This scenario, should it come to pass, would naturally infringe 
upon the autonomy of the unenhanced. I will argue, however, that there is no evidence to 
support that this would be likely. In contemporary society, vaccines have widespread 
approval and many view getting vaccinated as a moral duty due to it proving effective herd 
immunity only if the percentage of population who have been vaccinated is high enough. 
Still, there are many people who do not want to take vaccines for numerous reasons, ranging 
from fear of side effects to distrust in the medical community. Yet, at least for the most part 
of the Western world, people are not forced to vaccinate themselves or their children. It 
would be strange to think that this would be different with, say, cognitive enhancement – 
after all, people choosing to stay cognitively unenhanced would not directly heighten other 
people’s chances of contracting potentially deadly diseases. 
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In conclusion, what I take to be the two greatest challenges to the human enhancement 
project are what Alberto Giubilini and Sagar Sanyal (2016) have described as the egalitarian 
concerns and the utilitarian concerns. The egalitarian concerns we have already discussed: 
these have to do with the fear that introducing human enhancement into societies would lead 
to increased inequality. Perhaps human enhancement is only available for the wealthy, and 
this would enable them to outcompete the poor on the job market. Utilitarian concerns, on the 
other hand, we have not yet touched upon, and they have to do with diminishing global well-
being. The worry here is that the human enhancement project could drain resources away 
from places where they could make a bigger positive impact (Giubilini & Sanyal 2016, p. 
14). Enhancing people’s cognitive capacities might generally be a morally good thing, but if 
the money used towards researching and producing cognitive enhancement interventions 
would be used to produce affordable medicine for the poor instead, the global net-wellbeing 
would surely see a much larger increase. 
I will tackle both concerns later when I argue my case for moral enhancement. Before I do 
that, it is important to define what moral enhancement exactly is, as well as what is at stake. 
 
4. Moral enhancement 
 
What are human moral enhancements? The question seems simple: they are, of course, 
enhancements that make humans more moral. This answer, however, begs the question of 
what “being more moral” entails. There are, after all, multiple competing ethical doctrines. A 
utilitarian might be happy if we created an advanced computer chip which, when attached to 
a person’s brain, ensured that they would never act so as to cause the overall wellbeing in the 
world to decrease. However, many other doctrines hold that it is not enough that our actions 
cause good – they must also be done for the right reasons. Indeed, someone following Kant’s 
categorical imperative would accept that we can imagine a situation in which we must do 
something that causes harm in order to uphold some universal moral law. Lying is always 
wrong, they might say, even if lying would in certain situations protect people from pain and 
heartache. 
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I will base my view of moral enhancement on the definition given by Alfred Archer, an 
opponent of moral enhancement, and the writings of Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, 
both of whom number among its proponents. Archer writes: 
“For my purposes then, I will assume that a moral enhancement is something that makes the 
subject of the enhancement more likely to perform morally good acts for the right reasons.” 
(Archer 2016, p. 501) 
To present my view fully, we must now combine this with another quote, this time from 
Savulescu and Persson: 
“Cognitive bioenhancement does not give knowledge—it requires effort and learning. Moral 
bioenhancement will not by itself produce moral behaviour. It requires effort and learning. 
But it may make it easier and more likely.”  
(Savulescu & Persson 2012, p. 412) 
So, much like cognitive enhancement would provide the enhanced with certain heightened 
capacities (e.g. superior focus or memory) that help with the process of learning, moral 
enhancement would provide the enhanced with heightened capacities that help with following 
moral guidelines. As an example, consider the following case. A person has diligently studied 
the impact of meat consumption on the environment, and concluded that eating meat is 
morally wrong based on it contributing to environmental destruction more than a vegetarian 
diet. Following this diet is hard for them, however, as they like the taste of meat and crave for 
it regularly. One day they are visiting a shop and see a particularly delicious-looking steak. 
They cannot help themselves and buy it, later cooking and eating it with delight. However, 
afterwards, they feel bad about it, and wish they had not done it – they feel guilty for not 
being able to resist their impulses and thus doing something they think is morally wrong. 
Now, consider the Archer quotation presented earlier. If we could give this meat-craving 
person a drug that would afford them a higher level of impulse control, they could very well 
have resisted their urge to eat meat. Even under the influence of this drug, they would still be 
acting for the right reasons. Their decision to refrain from eating meat comes from their 
diligent research into the environmental impact of meat consumption, so the basis of their 
decision is justified. I will assume everyone to agree that wanting to do their part in the fight 
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against climate change is morally commendable. The impulse control drug thus would have 
made the person more likely to perform morally good acts, for reasons they hold right. This is 
a crucial point to understand. When discussing moral enhancements, we are not going to be 
discussing pills that will teach people what is good – that will still be the domain of 
traditional moral education. Moral enhancement simply means giving people tools to better 
follow their moral code, much like cognitive enhancement will enable you to focus in your 
studies better but will not, by itself, teach you anything at all. 
The reason why this point is so important is because perhaps more so than any other type of 
enhancement, moral enhancement is often under attack based on accusations of undermining 
autonomy. John Harris, for example, has argued that autonomy requires the “freedom to fall”, 
the possibility of doing wrong, and that moral enhancement strips enhanced humans of that 
freedom (Harris 2010, p. 103, 110). In the light of the previous example, it is easy to see how 
moral enhancement could be viewed as promoting autonomy instead. Moral enhancement, at 
least the sort of moral enhancement commonly proposed, does not provide anybody with new 
beliefs or morals. If a person wants to refrain from eating meat but can’t help themselves due 
to weakness of will, it would seem that their autonomy is enhanced, not undermined, if they 
are given a drug that helps them follow through with actions they consider morally righteous. 
It also does not make sense to think that simply because the person is more moral and thus 
less likely to commit moral violations they would also be less autonomous. After all, as 
Savulescu and Persson have noted before, we do not think that “garden-variety” unenhanced 
virtuous people are in any meaningful way less autonomous than people who are morally 
corrupt (Savulescu & Persson 2012, p. 409). There is a caveat to all this, however. If people 
are forced against their will to morally enhance themselves, then Harris’ argument holds 
more sway. Some people might want to remain morally unenhanced for their own reasons, 
and I would grant them this choice. 
A definitive list of capacities that, when reduced or increased, would count as moral 
enhancements, is hard to produce. There are some notable candidates, however. Impulse 
control has already been mentioned. It is hard to imagine a likely scenario where having a 
worse impulse control could be a betterment. Savulescu and Person have pointed to a 
scenario where enhanced impulse control could help a Nazi soldier better resist their impulses 
of helping those suffering under their regime (Savulescu & Persson 2012, p. 411). However, 
since I see traditional moral education and moral enhancement working in tandem, I would 
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rather place the blame in this sort of scenario at the feet of a faulty moral code. It could even 
be argued that the Nazi, despite taking the impulse control drug, was not “morally enhanced”, 
as he was presumably not acting for the right reasons. Other notable candidates for moral 
enhancement are interventions that decrease racial aversion and violent aggression (Douglas 
2008), as well as interventions that increase capacity for altruism and co-operation 
(Savulescu & Persson 2012, p. 410-411). In fact, in response to their Nazi scenario, 
Savulescu and Persson have noted that enhancing these other positive moral traits could help 
counter this sort of misuses, since a Nazi with enhanced altruism (or aversion to violent 
aggression) would probably not use their enhanced capacity for impulse control in service of 
oppression (Savulescu & Persson 2012, p. 411). 
There are many promising studies on how some of these desired changes could be produced 
biomedically. However, as the other authors have already made detailed reports on the 
subject, I will simply refer you to read those instead of repeating them here (Persson & 
Savulescu 2012, p. 118-122; Savulescu & Persson 2012, p. 400-405; Archer 2016, p. 500). 
What is important in these studies is that since biomedical interventions seemingly can affect 
our morals (even if we cannot control their effects very well yet), that means that morals are, 
at least partially, biological. If something has a biological component, then with enough 
research and studying, we might learn to influence it with some accuracy – as we are 
currently doing with using Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) to treat 
depression. 
 
4.1 The case for moral enhancement 
 
Now that I have laid out what moral enhancement is, the next question to be answered is why 
is pursuing it of importance. It is nice to be surrounded by morally good people, sure, but 
why should research be focused on moral enhancement instead of, say, cognitive 
enhancement? Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have in their book “Unfit for the Future: 
The Need for Moral Enhancement” (2012) and in an follow-up article (Savulescu & Persson 
2012) argued a case for the urgent need of morally enhancing the human species in the name 
of preventing great catastrophes and large-scale suffering. They base this argument on a 
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certain view of human nature and the current political system, which I will now present here 
in a condensed form. 
Persson and Savulescu argue that common human morality is in many ways flawed. 
According to them, humans think that omitting to prevent harm is less morally reprehensible 
than causing harm (Persson & Savulesu 2012, p. 22-24), and that humans are also biased 
towards events that are going to happen nearer in the future and discount things that are going 
to be taking place later on (Persson & Savulesu 2012, p. 27-28). In addition, humans are 
egocentric in the sense that we are mainly interested in events that happen near us (Persson & 
Savulesu 2012, p. 28-29) and possess only very limited capacity for altruism and empathy 
towards strangers (Persson & Savulesu 2012, p. 38). Allow me to give an example of all this. 
When humans living in Western societies take part in consumeristic behavior that exploits the 
people producing goods in poorer countries, they feel very little responsibility, since the 
problem is not their singular purchase of questionably produced goods but the vast system of 
exploitation that millions participate in. In this way, their own share of the blame becomes 
emotionally diluted in this sea of shared responsibility (Persson & Savulesu 2012, p. 24-25). 
At the same time, when people in well-off societies read news about the labor conditions in 
sweatshops producing brand-name sneakers for them to buy, they feel less bad than they 
would if the shop was operating in the neighboring town, staffed by people they could easier 
identify with. Humans also might know that their behavior is, in the long run, destructive to 
the state of the environment and perhaps the future of the whole species. However, since the 
bulk of those negative consequences are going to manifest themselves somewhere far into the 
future, and doing something about the situation would require humans to deny themselves 
pleasure right now, they are less inclined to change their habits, even if the long-term effects 
of their actions would be catastrophic. 
Persson and Savulescu argue that these moral shortcomings are the result of our 
psychological evolution, which for the most part of our species existence took place in small, 
tightly knit communities with only very limited technology (Savulescu  & Persson 2012, p. 
400). Humans living in these conditions were primarily concerned with the short-term 
survival of their own little community, surviving into the next week so to say, and thus had 
ample reason to distrust strangers and harvest for as much food as they could get whenever it 
was available. Their primitive technology could be used to shape only their closest 
surroundings, and even then, probably not to a great degree. Persson and Savulescu continue 
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that even if the human species has, through the use of technologies provided to them by 
science, gained unprecedented power and reach during the span of the last few hundred years, 
the human moral psychology is still very close to the way it was all those thousands of years 
ago (Savulescu  & Persson 2012, p. 400). This explains why even if we can affect the lives of 
people on the other side of the world to a great degree, we still struggle to adequately feel the 
moral impact of our decisions. To Savulescu and Persson, humans are moral cave dwellers 
with internet. This is a recipe for disaster for multiple reasons. First, with advanced 
technology within the reach of many humans, a single bad individual could create a weapon 
of mass destruction and destroy a city of millions, causing terrible suffering (Savulescu & 
Persson 2012, p. 400). Second, in our lack of foresight, we are rapidly destroying our own 
environment (Ibid.). This could lead to devastating wars over dwindling resources as well as 
the end of human civilization as we know it. Both the threat of weapons of mass destruction 
and the threat of environmental degradation needs to be taken seriously, because, according 
to Persson and Savulescu, either one of these could lead to what they call the ultimate harm 
(Persson & Savulescu 2012, p. 46). The ultimate harm, if it came to pass, would mean all life 
worth living being extinguished from earth, thus causing unmeasurable harm. As such, we 
have a good reason to take whatever actions necessary to change our course. 
Persson and Savulescu are skeptical, however, that the contemporary liberal democracies are 
up to the task ahead. They refer (Persson & Savulescu 2012, p. 74-79) to a study by Cass 
Sunstein, which found that the average American citizen holds the life of an American person 
2000 times as important as the life of a person living in a poor country (Sunstein 2007, p. 44). 
Sunstein also reports that 52% of Americans would not support the Kyoto Protocol for 
greenhouse gas reduction if it would cost an average American family 50 dollars per month 
or more. This number dropped further to just 11% if the cost was 100 dollars or more. These 
findings by Sunstein are evidence that, at least back in 2007, the American public was not 
willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing to fight the climate change. With the US initiating 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation in 2017, it is hard to 
believe that the situation would have vastly improved.  Also, as the effects of climate change 
will probably hit the poorer countries in Africa and South-East Asia first and harder, it is 
unlikely that these attitudes will change before it is too late to stop the process. 
This unwillingness displayed by the American citizens to sacrifice a moderate part of their 
wellbeing to help with a global crisis means, according to Persson and Savulescu, that any 
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politician committing to solving these issues would be potentially committing a political 
suicide (Persson & Savulescu 2012, p. 80). Creating effective measures to combat global 
threats such as the one climate change presents require policies that are in power for decades. 
Politicians hardly have incentives to jeopardize their whole careers by championing 
unpopular causes if it just means they will be voted out in the next election and the policies 
they created will be dismantled by the people replacing them. Politicians are, after all, 
humans too, and the worst effects of climate change will come after their career is already 
over, or they could even be already dead by then. (Persson & Savulescu 2012, p. 80.) Another 
challenge for liberal democracies is that global issues require global solutions, and thus there 
is no reason for a country to limit its actions or to spend its resources if they have no 
guarantees that the other nations will do the same. Otherwise, they would just be weakening 
their position on the global market for nothing (Persson & Savulescu 2012, p. 81-82). 
This pessimistic view of human nature, the future and the capability of liberal democracies 
has led Savulescu and Persson to propose moral enhancement as a solution (Savulescu & 
Persson 2012, p. 400). Humans need to be enabled to rise above their moral shortcomings and 
to take responsibility for their actions. The limits of altruism must be extended to encompass 
both the global humanity as well as the as-of-yet unborn future generations. If large-scale 
moral enhancement programs could be established, the citizens of liberal democracies could 
be made to feel the weight of the moral responsibility bestowed upon them by the power of 
their planet-altering technologies. In the light of this new-found moral insight, they would 
vote more responsible, for morally good politicians who would then be responsible for a 
morally good electorate. If this program had global success, these politicians could then count 
on the co-operation and moral integrity of their counterparts in other countries. Together, 
they could enable policies that would take responsibility for the global poor, curb rampant 
consumerism and promote new greener technologies in order to avert the worst effects of 
climate change. As a bonus, the morally enhanced citizens would also not create their own 
weapons of mass destruction and use them to level cities or destroy the planet6. 
                                                
6 As a side note, Persson and Savulescu do not believe that moral enhancement can stop all the potential 
terrorists - psychopaths, for example, would probably not benefit from moral enhancement. This has led them to 
propose restricting freedom of press (to stop distribution of weapon schematics) and the right to privacy (to 
better monitor people suspect of being potential terrorists) (Persson & Savulescu 2012, p. 124-125). 
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Persson and Savulescu have naturally received criticism for their theory. John Harris (2011) 
has argued that moral enhancement would undermine the autonomy of the enhanced, while 
Rob Sparrow (2014) has proposed that a moral enhancement that does not make the moral 
reasons behind the acts more noble is not actually a moral enhancement at all. Alfred Archer 
(2016), on the other hand, has expressed worries that some people might have reasonable 
objections to being enhanced, and these people might be disenfranchised in a society where 
they had to coexist with the morally enhanced. Harris’ and Sparrow’s objections we have 
largely already dealt with in the last section. Archers objection will become relevant in the 
next section. 
 
5. Better decisions through enhancing decision-makers 
 
I will now proceed to present a modified defense of moral enhancement based on the 
foundations laid by Persson and Savulescu. I think that Persson and Savulescu are correct in 
their assessment of human moral shortcomings and the effects these have on our liberal 
democracies. Unlike them, however, I would be hesitant to propose large-scale moral 
enhancement programs as the solution, mainly because of issues of feasibility. Thus, I move 
to argue that introducing moral enhancement to societies would be beneficial for them even if 
the vast majority of people would remain unenhanced. The point of my argument is not to 
suggest that it would not be good to have as many morally enhanced people as possible, but 
just to state that this is not necessary in order for moral enhancement to be advisable. I argue 
that creating moral enhancement interventions and allowing their use will lead, by itself, to 
the election of morally enhanced decision makers, and through them, morally better 
decisions. 
The way I see Persson’s and Savulescu’s argument, the reason for their endorsement of 
creating a morally enhanced citizenry is to first enable the election of morally enhanced 
politicians and then to ensure they stay in power. Common citizens, no matter how moral, can 
only do so much, and while it is commendable to recycle and to be a conscious consumer, 
large-scale problems demand centralized solutions. Getting a wide-scale moral enhancement 
program established in multiple countries is, to put it mildly, a titanic political endeavor. It 
would require the same morally unenhanced politicians who are failing to address climate 
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change adequately to divert considerable resources into the matter, and it would also require 
the citizens to want to morally enhance themselves. The other option would naturally be to 
have the political leaders force moral enhancement on everyone, but in societies where 
hugely beneficial and widely accepted vaccines are not mandatory, I find this highly 
improbable. It would also be strange that the same politicians who fear backlash from 
increasing taxes to combat climate change would not hold their hand from enforcing 
enhancement interventions on the population. Thus, I find it unlikely we will have a largely 
morally enhanced population in time to combat climate change, even if the actual moral 
enhancement interventions were available very soon. This does not mean, however, that we 
could not still have morally enhanced political leaders. 
It is much more likely – at least in the short term – that societies will have only some morally 
enhanced people in them rather than most of the population being enhanced. My argument is 
that in this scenario, the problem of positional advantage raised in section 3.2 could work for 
the benefit of the society by giving the morally enhanced members of the population a 
competitive advantage when applying for public offices. When citizens vote in elections, they 
cast their votes based on multiple factors: what party the candidate represents, what values 
they have, what kind of policies they propose, is their personality appealing, and so on. Many 
personality traits commonly thought to be valuable and positive are moral traits. These 
include, for example, honesty, good-heartedness, fairness and integrity. All of these moral 
traits could be enhanced through suitable moral enhancements. Alfred Archer has argued that 
moral enhancements would disenfranchise the unenhanced because people would probably 
prefer to have morally enhanced persons as their partners, friends and employees due to their 
reliability (Archer 2016, p. 505). It is not hard to imagine people preferring an enhanced 
politician for the very same reasons. Since the thought is quite intuitive, it is not a stretch to 
think that individuals with political ambitions would seek to enhance themselves morally to 
give them a competitive edge in the elections. Following this line of thinking, it is not 
necessary to endeavor to bring moral enhancement to everyone. All that needs to happen is 
for it to be available. 
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5.1 Possible criticism 
 
First off, let us look at the egalitarian concerns raised in the section 3.3. If my argument holds 
true, then there is a quite clear danger of increasing inequality. If moral enhancement 
interventions were expensive, then perhaps only the very wealthy could afford them. If 
citizens would then strongly prefer to vote for the morally enhanced, it could lead to a society 
where only the wealthy would have a fair chance of being elected. Most democratic elections 
already have many problems similar to this. People with wealth can use it to bolster their 
election campaigns, and celebrity candidates can leverage their fame to gain a platform for 
their ideas. These problems naturally do not grant a license to make things even worse. There 
are positive aspects to be found, however. Morally enhanced individuals, once elected, could 
work towards bringing moral enhancement more readily available to the rest of the citizens. 
Giving the powerful and the wealthy incentives to morally enhance themselves could also 
have a wide range of positive effects on the society, and having morally responsible 
lawmakers could help make the society as a whole more equal. This could balance out the 
initial inequality possibly caused by moral enhancement. 
Next, the utilitarian concerns. It is probably true that in the short term more global wellbeing 
could be achieved by funneling all the resources directed at moral enhancement into helping 
the poor and the needy. However, since a morally responsible political leadership is needed to 
combat climate change and thus avert the ultimate harm, an unmeasurable amount of 
wellbeing could be lost by not investing in moral enhancement7. Morally enhanced political 
leadership is also more likely to take a more responsible stance towards the poorer countries 
of the world and provide more assistance than the current governments of affluent nations are 
doing. 
There is always the possibility that citizens do not want to vote for morally enhanced 
candidates. There are numerous reasons to vote for a politician, and some of those reasons 
might even be immoral. A person voting for a hardline nationalist candidate might have a 
strong aversion towards people of different ethnicity and hope for the candidate (if he is 
                                                
7 At least if you don’t subscribe to a view such as presented by David Benatar in his book “Better Never to Have 
Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence” (2016), which holds that coming into existence is a serious harm 
that all the wellbeing you experience in life can never repay. 
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elected) to make life more difficult for people matching that criteria. This sort of person is not 
voting because they believe their candidate is more moral than their opposition, so it is hard 
to imagine they would vote for someone speaking for softer values just because they happen 
to be morally enhanced. I agree with this assessment. I will argue, however, that only in rare 
cases will people hold being more moral against a candidate. Donald Trump was elected in 
2016 for many reasons, including but not limited to his tough policy on immigration, his 
perchance for not letting the truth get in the way of a good story, and his reputation as a 
shrewd businessman. Many of these things are morally questionable, yes. Despite this, I do 
not think that many people voted for him because he is immoral. Many of Trump’s campaign 
promises, such as the infamous vow to “drain the swamp”, centered on him being an outsider 
coming to fix politics and fight corruption. These sort of promises would be even more 
attractive coming from a certifiably moral candidate. Based on this, I think that being more 
moral would more often count in the favor of the candidate than against them. I will also hold 
that not every candidate who is elected needs to be morally enhanced to bring about positive 
changes. In countries with a history of coalition governments, it is possible for the national 
agenda to make a turn towards environmental friendliness just because a small green party 
was needed to form the government. If a decent percentage of elected officials are morally 
enhanced, they could still influence policy making into the right direction without even being 
the majority. 
If only some of the politicians are enhanced, there might be a danger of the morally 
unenhanced politicians abusing the properness of the enhanced ones. Politics is often 
described as a game – and a rather dirty game at that – where half-truths, backstabbing and 
backroom deals are part of the daily life. If the morally enhanced politicians would not 
consent to use immoral tactics to further their political goals, it could hamper their ability to 
act effectively on the political arena. I will argue, however, that the concerns raised by Archer 
could again work in the favor of the morally enhanced here. If people have strong reasons to 
prefer morally enhanced people as partners due to their reliability, it also work as an incentive 
for unenhanced politicians to seek them out as allies. The reason why politics is mired in 
underhanded tactics can be due to politicians being unable to trust other politicians not to 
seek short-term victories on their expense, thus leading to a political prisoner’s dilemma. This 
problem would be mitigated through the introduction of morally enhanced politicians in the 
system, potentially making politics in general more cooperative and trusting. 
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I have showed before that moral enhancement does not make anybody more moral by itself 
without proper moral education. This being so, could it not be that immoral people with no 
moral education are going to morally enhance themselves to gain public approval, and then 
use enhancement-immune moral nature to further their selfish goals in power? Certainly, this 
is a possibility. I will, however, attest that this would only be the case on very rare occasions. 
Most of humans in liberal democracies, through shared basic education, share a basic 
understanding of morals. They know it is immoral to lie, steal, cheat and so on. The reason 
why humans still do these things is more often than not out of weakness of character, not out 
of epistemological defects. Thus, most people would benefit from moral enhancement, and 
even the few how are truly unable to distinguish between right and wrong could benefit from, 
for example, heightened capacity for altruism or lessened racial aversion.  
Another related problem to the one I just described is the question of how we can distinguish 
a morally enhanced person from a one who is not. Perhaps ambitious and immoral people 
could just claim to be morally enhanced in order to gain the public trust, but in reality would 
have no intentions of enhancing themselves. This issue already exists in politics: politicians 
are often caught lying about their background, their achievements or their academic 
credibility. It is the job of journalists check the validity of claims like this, and moral 
enhancement should be no different. It is also not that hard to imagine moral enhancements 
being administered in the same way as vaccines are, and in this case a clinic administering 
the enhancement intervention could even give their patients a certificate of their enhanced 
status. 
Next, remembering Sunstein’s study on the American attitudes toward strangers and climate 
change, what is to stop the public from voting the morally enhanced out of office if they raise 
the taxes or restrict consumption of red meat to fight climate change? In practice, nothing. 
However, in voting against a morally enhanced candidate would mean that the voter would 
have to admit to themselves that they do not want morally good policies, which could act as a 
deterrent towards the enhanced losing their voter base. A disgruntled voter could also find a 
new candidate in another morally enhanced person running for the office and vote for them 
instead. Morally enhanced people are, after all, still individuals with their own personalities, 
even if they all benefit from a higher capacity for altruism, impulse control and so on. It is not 
a far-fetched idea that they would still be treated by the voters as individual candidates, and 
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not just lumped together as clones of each other. This is especially probable if different 
parties have morally enhanced candidates. 
Finally, there is the possibility that even if everything I have said above holds true, perhaps 
moral enhancement interventions are just not a very good or efficient way to achieve the 
desired results when weighted against other possible ways of creating more morally 
responsible societies. Research into biomedical interventions, clinical tests to ensure their 
safety as well as their distribution takes time and resources. On the other hand, liberal 
democracies typically already have quite comprehensive formal education systems, with most 
citizens going through some sort of general education during their childhood and 
adolescence. In these societies, there could be argued to have been major moral developments 
for the better during the last hundred years or so, with no help from moral enhancement. 
Information campaigns on the effects of climate change as well as media coverage on the 
subject have also been successful in bringing the issue to the spotlight and increasing global 
political pressure. Perhaps the better solution is simply to double down on what we have 
already seen working in the past? This could entail putting our efforts into increasing the 
quality of moral education in schools and working to secure more funding for beneficial non-
governmental organizations as well as ensuring the continued freedom of the press. Some 
commentators certainly have thoughts running along these lines. Robert Sparrow, for 
example, has argued that the problems facing humanity today stem from deep socio-
economic issues of inequality between individuals as well as nations. According to Sparrow, 
the situation could be corrected by removing institutional structures that reward egoistic and 
short-sighted behavior, thus rendering moral enhancement unwarranted. (Sparrow 2013, p. 
29.) 
In response to this last possible objection, I would argue that there is no need to set moral 
education8 against research into moral enhancement any more than there is a need to set 
information campaigns about the importance of recycling against research into renewable 
energy sources. Moral enhancement interventions would simply empower individuals to 
better follow their moral codes, and thus their effectiveness in fostering morally better 
decisions is limited by the quality of the ethical thinking of the enhanced. Following this line 
of thinking, better moral education and more information on ethical issues would also 
                                                
8 Or beneficial non-governmental organizations, efforts towards eliminating institutional corruption, and so on. 
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empower moral enhancement to work as intended. Arguing as if we must choose one or the 
other – moral education or moral enhancement – is to indulge in a zero-sum fallacy. Liberal 
democracies do and will for the foreseeable future support both multiple research projects as 
well as varied education initiatives at the same time. While Robert Sparrow is undoubtedly 
correct that many of our pressing political concerns would be gone if we eliminated 
institutional incentives for selfish behavior, he offers no new insight into how this change 
could be facilitated. After all, the problem is not exactly new, and it is largely the same 
legislators who benefit from those incentives who would have to work to get rid of them, 
which is one of the key issues behind Savulescu’s and Persson’s pessimism towards the 
capabilities of the liberal democracies. Perhaps a new generation of more moral lawmakers, 
armed with better moral education, would indeed succeed in evading the siren call of short-
term decision making and pandering to voters’ baser instincts. In the meantime, there is no 
reason to not also research into moral enhancement interventions as another possible avenue 
towards morally better decision making. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have argued that the opponents of the human enhancement project have thus 
far failed to produce credible objections to enhancement as a whole, leaving at least some 
forms of enhancement as morally permissible or even praiseworthy. I have further advanced a 
view that out of these permissible forms of enhancement, moral enhancement is especially 
potential from the point of view of generating morally better decisions in societies. Unlike 
Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson have argued before, my argument does not call for a 
wide-scale adoption of moral enhancement interventions in societies. Instead, I have argued 
that merely enabling at least some of the people living in the societies with the possibility of 
morally enhancing themselves, these enhanced individuals will be able to out-compete their 
non-enhanced rivals in democratic elections, leading to morally better political decision-
making. While this can be problematic from the viewpoint of equality – especially if moral 
enhancement interventions are not widely available –  I take the result of more just and 
globally responsible societies to trump these concerns. 
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Does this mean that we should stop investing in moral education or public information 
campaigns and funnel all available resources into researching moral enhancement 
interventions? Hardly. Moral enhancement, by itself, will not make anybody more moral. It 
will just make it easier for those enhanced to act according to their moral code when it is 
conflicted with, for example, poor impulse control or biases. As such, a more robust degree 
of moral education and better information will empower moral enhancement, just as moral 
enhancement will empower individuals to put that education and information to practice. Just 
like it is sound to research into multiple different types of environment-friendly modes of 
energy production, it is also sound to research into multiple different avenues of making the 
current political system better. Human moral enhancement needs to be recognized and 
considered as one potential piece of a larger puzzle to creating globally more responsible 
societies – not as an end-all solution to all of humanity’s problems. 
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